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ABSTRACT
I analyze the problem faced by an asymmetrically informed supranational governmental
authority (SNGA) with limited financial resources who wishes to design an International
Environmental Agreement (IEA).  The SNGA cannot contract directly with polluting firms in the
various LDCs, but he must deal with such firms through their governments. I study this tripartite
hierarchical interaction and focus on the properties of the optimal ex post contracts (IEA's), which
can be implemented by the SNGA, in turn, in the case where governments and firms in each
nation do not collude and then in the case where governments and firms do collude.  I find that
the monetary transfers necessary to induce optimal behavior by governments and firms are not
very sensitive to the presence of collusion.  However, because the optimal contracts satisfy
budget balance, and because there is a ceiling on the amount of pollution reduction that an IEA
can require, the level and pattern of pollution abatement is never ideal.  My analysis suggests that
IEAs are not inherently doomed due to a basic monitoring and enforcement problem arising from
national sovereignty.  However, the success of IEAs is fundamentally contingent on the funds
available for environmental protection and the pollution reduction ceiling negotiated by the
SNGA and the LDC government. JEL Classification:  D62, D82, Q25
Key words:  environmental, agreement, LDCs, budget, ceilingThis paper has benefited from the comments of seminar participants at the College of William and Mary
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and at the University of California, Berkeley; three anonymous referees have also assisted me in improving the quality
of this paper.  The usual disclaimer applies. 
In this paper I shall use the terms IEA and contract interchangeably.
2
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION:  THE EFFECT OF BUDGET BALANCE
AND POLLUTION CEILING CONSTRAINTS
1.  Introduction
1
With the passage of time, it has increasingly been recognized that environmental
protection is an international issue.  As noted by Bernauer (1995, p. 354), the scope and
significance of this issue have been amply demonstrated by the events of the 1992 Earth Summit
in Rio.  At this Summit, it became clear that if the northern countries of the world wanted “. . . the
environment to be secured for future generations, [then they would] have to radically assist the
South in choosing a different road to development than the one they [had] currently [been]
traveling on” (Rogers 1993, p. 27).  Indeed, to combat the twin evils of poverty and
environmental degradation, developing countries (LDCs) have demanded the transfer of
resources and technology from developed countries.  In such a contentious setting, the success
or failure to protect the environment will depend crucially on the ability of international
institutions to craft effective international environmental agreements (IEAs).   Given this, the key
2
question becomes “How can international institutions, which necessarily respect the principle of
state sovereignty, contribute to the solution of difficult global problems?” (Keohane, Haas, and
Levy 1993, p. 6).  This is the central question that I propose to analyze in this paper. 2
The countries I have in mind are those which would be eligible to receive monetary transfers under th e
3
Global Environmental Facility's (GEF) standard of per capita income of $4,000 or less.  For more details, see Rogers
(1993, p. 155). 
On the academic front, researchers have only recently begun to study issues relating to
global environmental protection in a systematic manner.  As a result, many specific questions
remain unanswered.  What kinds of pollution abatement patterns can one expect to observe in
economic environments in which an asymmetrically informed supranational governmental
authority (SNGA) contracts with governments and polluting firms in individual countries?  What
kinds of monetary transfers will be necessary to get sovereign nations to voluntarily participate
in IEAs?  How does the SNGA's inability to monitor pollution abatement in the individual
countries affect the contract design question?  What are the effects of pollution reduction ceiling
constraints?  Finally, how does the limited availability of funds affect the SNGA's IEA design
question?  These are the specific questions that I shall address in this paper. 
Although my analysis is, in principle, applicable to any country, the hierarchical
interaction that I shall analyze is particularly relevant to LDCs; as such, the reader should note
that it is these countries that I have in mind in all of the subsequent analyses.   I now discuss the
3
nascent literature on IEAs and then move on to discuss my model in detail. 
2.  International Environmental Agreements:  A Brief Synopsis
Barrett (1994) has modeled IEAs as games between different countries.  While Barrett's
analysis is not in the design framework, Barrett makes the important point that for IEAs to work
at all, they must be self-enforcing.  However, this research has not addressed fundamental
questions arising from asymmetrically held information, and the heterogeneity of the contracting3
Specifically in its role as an administrator of the Global Environmental Facility (GEF). 
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countries.  Hoel (1992) has analyzed an IEA in which countries uniformly reduce their pollution
emissions.  Hoel argues against the institution of such uniform emissions reduction policies in
international agreements.  He shows that other policies yield higher levels of global welfare. 
Shogren, Baik, and Crocker (1992, hereafter SBC), and Sandler and Sargent (1995,
hereafter SS) have addressed the question of the minimal number of countries needed to sustain
an IEA.  In a multiplayer strategic setting, SBC show that countries will sometimes join IEAs
because the expected gains from such action outweigh the gains from not joining.  However,
beyond a critical threshold value, some countries will prefer to free ride and not join the IEA,
whereas the IEA members will want nonparticipants to join.  SS (p. 152) show that the attainment
of international coordination by a “minimal-sized group” is fundamentally dependent on
“. . . how individual pollution activities add to the total pollutants experienced . . . [by nations].”
While these papers have certainly advanced our understanding of some aspects of “. . . the multi-
faceted design . . . problem” (Black, Levi, and de Meza 1993, p. 281), many other important
questions—which I discussed in section 1— remain unanswered.  As such, I now discuss my
modeling approach to the IEA design question. 
I shall model the international environment as a multiforked, three-tiered hierarchy.
Occupying the topmost tier of the hierarchy is the relevant international institution or SNGA.
This SNGA could be an organization such as the World Bank,  or the Commission on Sustainable
4
Development (CSD), created in Agenda 21 at the Rio Earth Summit.  The second and third tiers
of the hierarchy consist of the government and a representative polluting firm in each LDC.  Each4
The reader will note that in this modeling scheme, I have conferred, on the SNGA, the role of principal.
5
As such, there is a distinct asymmetry in the assumed power of the SNGA as opposed to that of governments and
firms.  Given that I am interested in LDCs that typically have limited bargaining power in their dealings wit h
international organizations owing to the fact that their monetary contributions to the budgets of such organizations
are minimal, this hierarchical modeling scheme appears to be appropriate.  For more on the power of SNGAs over
LDCs, see Mosley, Harrigan, and Toye (1991). 
See Crane (1993) and Paarlberg (1993) for a discussion of the relevance of international institutions when
6
the incidence of an environmental externality is domestic. 
fork of the hierarchy corresponds to a single LDC, and there are N such countries.   Three-tiered
5
hierarchies have been studied by Tirole (1986, 1988) and by Kofman and Lawarree (1993),
among others.  These researchers have studied the effects of potential collusion between the
various players in their three-tier hierarchies.  However, to the best of my knowledge, the
problem of hierarchical contracting with budget balance and pollution reduction ceiling
constraints has not been studied to date. 
As such, I shall build on and apply the theory of hierarchies to study ex post contracting
between the SNGA, national governments, and polluting firms in the various LDCs.  The
rationale for the actual contracting stems from issues including, but not limited to, the harmful
atmospheric effects of sulphur and/or nitrogen emissions.  The incidence of pollution may be
domestic or transboundary.   The key element of uncertainty stems from the SNGA's lack of
6
knowledge about the pollution abatement technology/capability available in each country.
Whereas the firm in the LDC always knows its technology and the government does in some
states of nature, the SNGA is never privy to this information.  The random variable denoting the
private information about pollution abatement capability is uncorrelated across countries.  This
rules out the possibility of the SNGA engaging in relative performance evaluation.  Because most
LDCs are very heterogeneous, and because it is difficult to imagine a practical instance in whichj,
5
The exact nature of these roles is described in section 3. 
7
See Peterson (1993) for a discussion of some practical instances of possible government/firm collusion in
8
an international setting. 
a SNGA would want to design contracts involving relative performance evaluation, this
assumption of uncorrelatedness appears not to be restrictive.  In other words, my analysis holds
for any finite set of countries, with the SNGA/government/firm interaction in one country being
independent of the SNGA's dealings with some other country.  As such, without loss of
generality, I shall focus on an arbitrary country, say country   in the finite set of countries.  The
SNGA's task is to design an incentive-compatible and collusion-proof budget-balanced contract
which will lead to optimal pollution abatement in each country. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows.  In section 3, I describe the model in detail,
and I study the properties of the first best optimum.  In section 4, I study the above-described
three-tiered hierarchy with no collusion by the representative firm and the government.  In section
5, I study the case of collusion by the government and the polluting firm.  In both sections, I
analyze ex post contracts which can be implemented by the SNGA in a Bayes-Nash equilibrium.
The reasons for wanting to study collusion between the polluting firm and the LDC
government are rather obvious.  The government and the firm receive monetary transfers from
the SNGA for their roles in abating pollution.   Further, both these players know that the SNGA
7
cannot monitor their activities owing to sovereignty or, for that matter, enforce the terms of the
IEA in the event of a contractual breach.  As such, there will be circumstances in which there are
incentives for the government and the firm to collude to maximize the transfers received from the
SNGA.   Thus, an important part of this paper will consist of analyzing collusion-proof contracts.
8i 1,2,3,4 j 1,...,N
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L H
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In my formulation, the production of clean air is uncertain; the cost of abatement is not.  Further, uncertainty
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affects production additively.  Alternately, one could make the cost of abatement uncertain; more specifically, one
could make the uncertainty term enter the relevant function multiplicatively.  While additive uncertainty in the cost
function will not materially affect my results, multiplicative uncertainty in either the production function or the cost
function will certainly affect my results.  To see why, note that, while additive uncertainty leads to first-orde r
conditions with no random variable(s), multiplicative uncertainty results in first-order conditions with the random
variable(s).  As a result, without additional assumptions about the magnitudes of these random variables in the various
states or the magnitudes of the probabilities themselves, it is not possible to obtain concrete results. 
3.  The Theoretical Framework
3a.  Description of the Model
Subscripts   will refer to the state of nature, and superscripts   will refer
to the country.  Let   denote the uncertainty about abatement technology/capability that is
currently available;   has binary support   where   and    I shall refer
to   as the low abatement capability parameter and to   as the high abatement capability
parameter. 
The risk-averse firm produces clean air, where output and value are denoted by
 The firm chooses a level of pollution abatement   and   denotes the
uncertainty about the pollution abatement technology.  The firm's cost of abatement is g(a),
where   and    The firm has a differentiable net payoff from abatement
function   with     is the state  i  monetary transfer made by
the SNGA to the firm for abating pollution.  The firm's reservation payoff is   where 
and   is the reservation transfer.    and   are common knowledge.  
9
The LDC government is risk-averse.  It has a strictly concave and differentiable utility
function   where   is the state i monetary transfer made by the SNGA to the
government for its role in participating in the IEA.  Note that the government’s utility isˆ x j
ˆ x j
Vr V(Gr),






Although I am not modeling the bargaining game explicitly, the assumption that   is the endogenous
10
outcome of this game means that   is not set at an unreasonably high or low level.  This in turn means that these
pollution ceiling constraints will typically bind in equilibrium.  See the appendix for more details. 
Since the main objective of this paper is not to study domestic monitoring, I shall assume that the use of
11
this monitoring device is costless. 
independent of the level of clean air produced by the firm.  The government's reservation utility 
where   is the reservation transfer, and    The government performs two
important functions.  First, in concert with the SNGA, it negotiates a ceiling,   on the amount
of abatement that can contractually be required of the firm in its country.  This   is assumed to
be the endogenous outcome of a bargaining game between the SNGA and the LDC government,
the details of which I shall not be concerned with.  For the purpose of this paper, I shall require
that the SNGA treat this pollution ceiling   as an exogenous constraint.   In practical terms, the
10
existence of this constraint means that although the LDC government recognizes the value of
participating in an IEA, it is unwilling to give free rein to the SNGA to dictate pollution
abatement levels to domestic firms.  Second, by employing a monitoring device, the government
receives a signal s  from the firm regarding its private information and then it (the government)
sends a report r to the SNGA indicating what it observed about the firm's pollution abatement
capability parameter.   In some states of nature, this monitoring device malfunctions, and, hence
11
in these states, the government will be unable to provide the SNGA with a useful report.  Upon
receiving r, the SNGA offers the government a transfer    The reader should note that
making reporting a key government function is consistent with the government/SNGA interaction
proposed for one specific SNGA, namely, the Commission on Sustainable Development.  As
noted by Rogers (1993, p. 310), a key aspect of this interaction involves the
“. . . Commission's . . . considering information provided by governments . . . .” U j(a j j G j T j), j 1,...,N,








The SNGA is risk-neutral and has a welfare function defined over clean air which takes
the form   where the index j runs over N, the total number of
countries.  The quantity of clean air produced by the firm in country j is    As stated,
the SNGA's welfare is the difference between total clean air and the sum of government and firm
transfers.  In the rest of the paper, I shall suppress the country superscript; it is understood that
the focus is on country  j.  The SNGA designs the contract which he offers to the government and
the firm.  The contract can only be conditioned on what the SNGA actually observes, i.e., the
government's report, r, and the firm's production of clean air, x. 
In each country, there are four states of nature, each state occurring with probability 
where    The SNGA, the government, and the firm sign the contract holding asymmetric
information about  .  The contract is ex post, i.e., it is signed after the firm observes the actual
realization of  .  The firm always observes   before choosing its abatement level.  The
government, on the other hand, may or may not observe the firm's private information.  This
depends on whether the government's monitoring device functions or malfunctions.  In other
words, the government's signal, s, may or may not be informative.  I can now characterize the
four states as follows: 
* State 1:  The firm and the government both observe   
* State 2:  The firm observes   and the government observes nothing. 
* State 3:  The firm observes   and the government observes nothing. 
* State 4:  The firm and the government both observe   
In state 1, the firm and the government both observe the low abatement capability
parameter.  The government's monitoring device works and, hence, yields useful information.ˆ x.
G(x,r) T(x,r).
s 0 r 0.
9
I have assumed that the government always knows when its monitoring device malfunctions.  This
12
formulation keeps the SNGA’s problem interesting, while maintaining analytical tractability.  More involve d
formulations, in which the government does not know for sure when its monitoring device has malfunctioned, are
possible.  In these formulations, it becomes necessary to introduce a second random variable into the analysis in order
to explicitly model the government’s uncertainty about the reliability of the information received by it.  Th e
introduction of this second random variable increases the number of states and, hence, the number of constraints on
the SNGA’s overall problem.  In this way, these alternate formulations significantly complicate the underlyin g
analysis.  Further, these additional modeling features make it virtually impossible to obtain unambiguous results .
Also see footnote 13. 
In state 2, the firm observes the low abatement capability parameter but the government observes
nothing.  In this state, the government's monitoring device malfunctions.  In state 3, the firm
observes the high abatement capability parameter, and, once again, the government's monitoring
device malfunctions.  Finally, in state 4, the firm and the government observe the high abatement
capability parameter.  
12
Before the SNGA/government/firm game is played, the SNGA and the LDC government
negotiate the pollution reduction ceiling    Next, the three-player game is played.  The timing
of this game is as follows.  First, the firm observes the actual realization of   and the government
receives its signal s.  Second, the SNGA offers the contract to the government and the firm.
Third, the firm chooses a.  Fourth, clean air x is produced by the firm and the government sends
its report r to the SNGA.  Fifth, the SNGA compensates the government and the firm with
transfers   and   
In the remainder of this paper I shall assume that the SNGA can verify the veracity of the
government’s report r.  In other words, if the government's signal s is noninformative, then the
corresponding report r reflects this fact, and the SNGA can verify that the true facts are indeed
as they have been reported.  In symbols,    On the other hand, to keep the SNGA's
design problem interesting and to allow for the possibility of government/firm collusion, I permits r { ,0}.
Gr, Vr,
maxa[a g(a)].





The reader will note that I have restricted the government’s message space in certain states.  Specifically,
13
the government can lie only in states 1 and 4.  The government can also announce the wrong state, but, in my setup,
making such an announcement is equivalent to obtaining a noninformative signal.  While, in principle, this restriction
can be relaxed by allowing for an expanded range of governmental reporting options, from a practical standpoint, such
an action would make it exceedingly difficult to obtain concrete results.  This is because relaxing the above restriction
would lead to an increased number of states and, hence, to more constraints on the SNGA’s overall optimizatio n
problem. 
the government to lie and report that its signal is noninformative when in fact such is not the
case.   That is,   
13
This completes the description of my model.  I now consider the benchmark case in which
perfect information is acquired by the SNGA. 
3b.  The First Best Optimum
In this case, the SNGA observes   and the firm's pollution abatement choice.  When this
happens, the SNGA bypasses the government and contracts with the firm directly.  The
government receives its reservation transfer   and, hence, its reservation utility   in all states.
The SNGA solves    The first-order necessary condition requires that
  In other words, in the first-best optimum, the marginal cost of abatement is set
equal to the marginal welfare from abatement.  The optimal level of abatement   is the same in
all states.  The firm receives a transfer for undertaking pollution abatement, which is independent
of the state of nature.  This transfer equals   , where   is the reservation transfer and
 
I now discuss the more interesting cases in which the SNGA cannot determine the
realization of   or the actual abatement undertaken by the firm. 
4.  The No Government/Firm Collusion CaseGr,
Vr,
Gr ,
max{Ti,ai} i pi(ai i Ti)
B[Ti g(ai)] Br, i, ˆ x ai i, i, T3 g(a3) T2 g(a2 ),







In this section, I shall disallow the possibility of collusion between the government and
the firm.  When the government is paid its reservation transfer   it obtains its reservation utility
 and, hence, it is fully insured.  Further, since I am not allowing for the possibility of collusion
between the government and the firm and because the SNGA can verify the government's report,
by paying   the SNGA obtains the government's information at least cost.  In terms of the
design of the main contract, this means that the three-tiered hierarchy effectively reduces to a
two-tiered hierarchy in which the government plays a passive role. 
In this setting, the SNGA's problem is to solve 
(A)
subject to (A1)   (A2)   (A3)   (A4)
 and (A5)   
The four constraints in (A1) are the ex post participation constraints.  They tell us that it
must be individually rational for the firm to contract with the SNGA in every state.  This stems
from the fact that in this international setting, the SNGA cannot compel the firm to abate
pollution.  The four constraints in (A2) are the SNGA/government-negotiated “ceiling on
pollution reduction” constraints.  They tell us that the SNGA cannot, in any state, design a
contract which requires that the firm abate pollution in excess of the agreed upon ceiling 
Constraints (A3) and (A4) are the incentive compatibility constraints.  These constraints arise
because the SNGA has imperfect information about   in these two states.  These are also the
states in which the government's signal s is noninformative.  Constraint (A3) says that in state 3,
the firm should not claim that the state is actually 2.  Similarly, (A4) tells us that in state 2, theˆ M,
Gr a >ai, i,
A1g (a1) A3g (a3) A4g (a4)>A2g (a2), Ti Tr g(ai), i,
12
I shall not discuss the manner in which the SNGA raises funds.  One possibility would be to conform to
14
the text of the Rio Earth Summit agreement known as Agenda 21.  According to this agreement, developed countries
are supposed to contribute 0.7% of their GNP for the purposes of environmental protection.  For more details, see
Rogers (1993, pp. 151-160). 
firm should not claim that the state is actually 3.  Finally, (A5) denotes the SNGA's budget
constraints.  They tell us that irrespective of state, the total sum of transfers paid to the
government and the firm in the various countries cannot exceed the SNGA's available budget 
for environmental protection.   I can now solve the SNGA's problem (A), with constraints
14
(A1)-(A5).  I am led to 
Theorem 1:  The optimal contract in the three-tiered hierarchy is equivalent to the optimal
contract in a two-tiered hierarchy in which (i) the SNGA obtains the government's information
at least cost, (ii) the government's reward equals   in all states, (iii) the abatement levels satisfy 
and    (iv) the payoffs to the firm satisfy 
and (v) at the optimum, all the constraints except (A4) bind. 
Proof:  See the Appendix. 
Theorem 1 describes the level and pattern of pollution abatement that one may expect to
observe in my stylized N country world in which the SNGA contracts with the government and
the firm in each LDC independently.  First, parts (i) and (ii) tell us that because the SNGA
bypasses the government, irrespective of state, the government earns only its reservation transfer.
This is as we would expect.  Because the government’s reporting task is essentially irrelevant in
this context, the government does not earn any informational rents from its private information.
Alternately put, the government is paid the very minimum that will insure that it participates in
the SNGA’s incentive scheme. A1g (a1) A3g (a3) A4g (a4)>A2g (a2) A1,...,A4
i i , a
i 0 i 0, i 2, ai a .
a1 a4 a
13
See step 7 of the proof for the exact representation of these weights. 
15
Second, part (iii) tells us that the level of pollution abatement is never first best, and that
the optimal contract equalizes the weighted marginal cost of abatement in states 1, 3, and 4.  That
is,   holds, where   are weights.   The level of
15
abatement is never first best because the budget constraints and the pollution reduction ceiling
constraints bind at the optimum.  It is important to note that this result is not due to the existence
of the ceiling constraints per se.  Even if these constraints did not exist, the above result would
still hold because the budget constraints bind in equilibrium.  From the proof of Theorem 1, it is
clear that the attainment of the first-best level of abatement is closely linked to the SNGA's
shadow value of funds and to the shadow value of the ceiling constraints.  The larger these
shadow values, i.e., the larger   and   the greater the distortion between   and the levels of
abatement specified by the contract.  Indeed, it is easy to verify—see Step 6 of the proof—that
as  and   for     
Intuitively, we would expect   to hold because the SNGA has complete
information about   in states 1 and 4.  This notwithstanding, Theorem 1 tells us that the budget
balance constraints and the pollution ceiling constraints together drive a wedge between the
first-best level of abatement and the level of abatement that the SNGA can contractually require
of the firm in these two states.  Given that the SNGA cannot require the first-best level of
abatement in states in which he does have complete information, it should not be surprising that
the SNGA is unable to require that clean air be produced at the first-best level in states 2 and 3.
These are the states in which he has incomplete information about  .  In these two states, the







See footnote 10 as well. 
16
appropriate for state 2, and vice versa.  As such, the budget balance constraints, the pollution
ceiling constraints, and the requirements of incentive compatibility preclude the SNGA from
requiring that   hold in equilibrium. 
Third, parts (iv) and (v) tells us that at the optimum, all the ex post participation
constraints bind.  This means that the optimal contract offered by the SNGA must respect the fact
that the firm cannot be compelled to abate pollution, if doing so would be individually irrational.
Part (v) also tells us that all the pollution reduction ceiling constraints bind at the optimum.
Intuitively speaking, these constraints bind because the SNGA’s welfare function is linear and
increasing in the level of abatement.  As such, the SNGA will always want to set the level of
abatement at its upper bound.  In this case, the upper bound is given by the pollution ceiling
constraints.  
16
The fact that these ceiling constraints bind means that the LDC government’s negotiations
with the SNGA are critical to the nonattainment of the first best level of abatement.  In particular,
because   is the result of negotiations between the SNGA and the LDC government, we can think
of the level of   as a measure of the negotiating power of the government.  Thus, from a welfare
perspective, a high   implies a higher level of welfare for the SNGA and a lower payoff for the
polluting firm.  This is because the SNGA will always want a high   as its welfare function is
increasing in the level of abatement.  On the other hand, the LDC government will typically want
a low   because the government is representing the polluting firm in its country, and this
polluting firm’s net payoff from pollution abatement is decreasing in the level of abatement.  In
specifying the levels of pollution abatement, the contract described in Theorem 1 optimallyb( , ),
{T(•) b(r,x)} {G(•) b(r,x)}.
15
For more on the regulation of pollution with asymmetric information in a closed economy, see Batabyal
17
(1995) and the many sources cited therein.  Also see Demski and Sappington (1987). 
See footnote 8 as well. 
18
accounts for the conflicting interests of the SNGA and the polluting firm. 
I now proceed to consider the effects of government/firm collusion on the optimal ex post
contract designed by the SNGA.  
17
5.  The Government/Firm Collusion Case
Recall that because countries are sovereign, the SNGA is unable to either monitor the
actions of the government and the firm or enforce the terms of the IEA in the event of a
contractual breach.  Since the SNGA can never acquire the firm's private information and must
rely on the government's report to design the optimal contract, an efficient contract must not only
be individually rational and incentive compatible but it must be collusion-proof  as well. 
18
I shall model collusion between the government and the firm as follows.  Before the
resolution of the uncertainty regarding abatement capability, the firm and the government sign
a secondary contract which entails the offer and acceptance of a bribe from the firm to its
government.  Naturally, this secondary contract is unobservable by the SNGA.  The bribe 
can only be conditioned on what the firm and the government both observe, i.e., the government's
report r and clean air x.  With the offer and acceptance of this bribe, the firm's total transfer
becomes   and the government's total transfer becomes    I shall not
be concerned with the question of how the surplus from the bribe is divided.  For my purpose,
it is only necessary to stipulate that the bribe is actually paid by the firm to its government. ¯ G ¯ T
H
0.
max{ ¯ Gi,¯ Ti,ai} i pi ai i ¯ Gi ¯ Ti
Ti ¯ Ti,
V( ¯ Gi) Vr , i , ¯ G1 ¯ T1 g(a1) ¯ G2 ¯ T2 g(a2) ,
¯ G4 ¯ T4 g(a4) ¯ G3 ¯ T3 g(a3) , ¯ G3 ¯ T3 g(a3) ¯ G2 ¯ T2 g(a2 ) ,
¯ G2 ¯ T2 g(a2) ¯ G3 ¯ T3 g(a3 ) .
16
For a somewhat different approach to modeling collusion, see Kofman and Lawarree (1993). 
19
The collusion-proof transfers to the government and the firm will be denoted by   and  , respectively. 
20
Collusion by the firm and the government fundamentally alters the incentives of the
various parties and, as we shall see, the nature of the optimal contract that can be implemented
by the SNGA.  To see why the firm might want to bribe its government in my four-state world,
consider state 4.  In state 4, the government is indifferent between reporting that it has observed 
and reporting that it has observed   However, the firm would prefer that the government report
0.  This is one instance in which a clear rationale exists for the firm to bribe its government. 
In order to formulate and solve the SNGA's problem when there is collusion, I shall follow
Tirole (1986, pp. 192-197; 1988, pp. 461-462).   Tirole's method involves imposing constraints
19
in addition to the usual participation and incentive compatibility constraints.  These additional
constraints are designed to preclude government/firm collusion and, hence, make the main
contract collusion-proof. 
I can now formulate the SNGA's problem.  The SNGA solves
20
(B)
subject to (A1)-(A5) with   replaced with 
(B1) (B2)   (B3)
 (B4)   and (B5)
 
The constraints in (B1) are the government's participation constraints.  Constraints (B2)
and (B3) are the core collusion constraints.  Recall that in states 1 and 4, the government's signal
s is informative.  In these two states, the government can hide this fact.  Given this, constraintsa > ai , i , ˜ A1 g (a1) ˜ A3 g (a3) ˜ A4 g (a4) > ˜ A2 g (a2) ,
Gr ¯ Gi , i , ¯ Ti Tr g(ai) , i ,
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(B2) and (B3) tell us that should the firm bribe its government, then the total sum of the transfers
less the cost of pollution abatement in states 1 and 4 cannot be less than the corresponding totals
in states 2 and 3, respectively.  Constraint (B4) tells us that the government should not be able
to bribe the firm to abate—in state 3—at the level that is appropriate for state 2.  Similarly, (B5)
tells us that the government should not be able to bribe the firm to claim that the state is 3 when
it is 2.  Solving the SNGA's problem (B) subject to (A1)-(A5), and (B1)-(B5), I can state 
Theorem 2:  The optimal contract in the three-tiered hierarchy when there is government/firm
collusion is one in which (I)   and 
(ii)   (iii)   and (iv) at the optimum all the constraints except
(A4) and (B5) bind. 
Proof:  See the Appendix. 
Intuitively, in order to verify that the contract described in Theorem 2 is indeed
collusion-proof, I have to show that constraints (A1)-(A5) and constraints (B1)-(B5) are satisfied.
By part (iv) of Theorem 2, (A1), (A2), (A3), (A5), (B1), (B2), (B3), and (B4) are satisfied.  The
proof of Theorem 2 tells us that (A4) and (B5) hold as strict inequalities.  Thus, the equilibrium
contract is collusion-proof.  Note that the SNGA is typically worse off when the government and
the firm collude.  This is because in this collusion case, the number of binding constraints
exceeds the number of binding constraints in the no-collusion case.  However, if the SNGA does
indeed offer the contract with the characteristics described in Theorem 2, then his monetary
obligations will be as described in the Theorem.  This is because the equilibrium contract is
collusion-proof.  The SNGA offers the best contract possible from the set of feasible ex post
contracts that are constrained to be budget balancing and collusion-proof. 18
A comparison of the optimal ex post contracts without and with collusion can be made
with the aid of Table 1.  First, we see that the level of pollution abatement is never first best.  In
the no collusion case, we have seen that:  (i) asymmetric information, (ii) the requirements of
incentive compatibility in states 2 and 3, and (iii) the budget balance and the pollution ceiling
constraints prevented the SNGA from requiring that pollution be abated at the first best level.
Unlike the no collusion case, in this collusion case, the SNGA’s decision problem is characterized
by asymmetric information in all four states.  To account for this, the SNGA will typically want
to design the firm and government transfers in such a way so that incentive compatibility is
maintained and no collusion occurs.  However, in designing the firm and government transfers,
the SNGA does not have free rein because the budget balance constraints prevent the SNGA from
offering large sums of money to the            a > ai , i a > ai , i
A1g (a1) A3g (a3) A4g (a4) >
˜ A1g (a1) ˜ A3g (a3) ˜ A4g (a4) >
A2g (a2) ˜ A2g (a2)
ˆ x , i ˆ x , i
Gr V 1(Vr) , i Gr V 1(Vr) , i
Ti Tr g(ai) , i ¯ Ti Tr g(ai) , i
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Table 1.  Ex Post Contracting Without and With Collusion
Contracting Without Collusion With Collusion
Pollution abatement
Level and pattern
           
Clean air production
Transfers to the government
Net payoffs to the polluting 
    firm
government and the firm.  As well, the ceiling constraints prevent the SNGA from inducing the
firm to abate at high levels.  These features of the problem combine to make it impossible for the
SNGA to design a contract in which the first best level of abatement obtains. 
More formally, the level of pollution abatement is never first best because the budget
constraints and the pollution ceiling constraints bind.  As in the no collusion case, the attainment
of the first best level of abatement in the collusion-proof contract is closely related to the
magnitude of:  (i) the SNGA's shadow value of funds, and (ii) the shadow value of the ceiling
constraints.  It is important to note that these shadow values collectively prevent the attainment
of the first-best level of abatement.  That is, if either the budget constraints or the ceiling
constraints were eliminated, the SNGA would still be unable to design a first-best contract.  Note
that collusion has no qualitative impact on the pattern of abatement.  However, the quantitativeA1 ˜ A1, A3 ˜ A3,
20
Because this example is in terms of emissions directly and clean air production only indirectly, we have
21
a floor.  However, this should not confuse the reader, because a floor on pollution emissions is the same thing as a
ceiling on clean air production. 
impact will almost certainly be different because, in general, the weights   and     and 
etc., will not be the same. 
Second, the level of clean air production is the same in both contracting scenarios because
the pollution reduction ceiling constraints bind.  This tells us that the government’s negotiations
with the SNGA has a powerful impact on the optimal contract.  In the analysis of both instances,
the pollution reduction ceiling constraints bind.  As such, in no state can the SNGA require that
pollution be abated at the first-best level.  To fix ideas, consider the following numerical example.
Suppose that the pollutant in question is sulphur dioxide (SO ) emissions and that the firm is a 2
coal-fired electric power plant.  Further, suppose that the LDC government and the SNGA agree
on a SO  emissions floor  of 2.5 pounds per million British thermal units (mmBTUs) of 2
21
electricity generated.  In other words, the power plant cannot be required to reduce SO  emissions 2
below this 2.5 mm BTU figure.  Then my analysis tells us that the optimal contract will require
that this power plant reduce its emissions to exactly 2.5 pounds of SO  per mm BTUs.  2
As discussed in section 4, this floor can be thought of as a measure of the LDC
government’s negotiating power.  Further, the floor can also be given a welfare interpretation.
To see how, consider an emissions floor of 1.2 pounds of SO  per mm BTUs.  Since the 2
government is representing the firm in its nation and the firm’s payoff is decreasing in abatement,
the government will want to negotiate a relatively high floor on emissions (low ceiling on clean
air production).  On the other hand, the SNGA’s welfare is increasing in abatement, so the SNGA
will want to negotiate a low floor on emissions (high ceiling on clean air production).  Given this,21
Also, see the textual discussion immediately preceding section 5. 
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compared to the 2.5 figure, the 1.2 figure would imply a lower level of governmental negotiating
power, a lower payoff for the polluting firm, and higher welfare for the SNGA.  
22
Third, the transfers to the government remain unchanged; in both regimes, the government
earns its reservation transfer in all states.  This is the expected result in the no collusion case.  The
government plays a completely passive role, and, hence, it is paid only its reservation transfer and
no more.  In the collusion case, the government plays an active role.  Despite this, the
government earns no informational rents because the SNGA is successful in inducing the
government to reveal its private information truthfully at least cost.  More formally, the
government earns no rents because all four participation constraints bind. 
Fourth, the net payoff to the firm exhibits the same pattern in both contracting regimes.
In other words, the possibility of government/firm collusion does not result in any qualitative
difference in the monetary transfers that are to be paid to the polluting firm.  However, it should
be noted that in the collusion case, the SNGA designs the firm transfers so that the equilibrium
contract is collusion-proof. 
6.  Conclusions
In this paper I analyzed the question of environmental protection for developing countries
within the framework of the directives set forth in the various agreements reached at the 1992 Rio
Earth Summit.  I modeled the institutional setting for the underlying problem as a three-tiered
hierarchy with N forks and then I studied the nature of the optimal, budget-balanced, ex post
contracts, without and with collusion.  Three significant policy conclusions emerge. 22
First, whether or not there is collusion, the participation constraints for the government
and the firm bind at the optimum.  This means that the SNGA is forced to pay a price in order to
obtain voluntary participation by the players in the individual nations.  Several observers, such
as Rogers (1993, p. 236), have worried that many of the Earth Summit directives “. . . offer a
back door option by which signatories can excuse themselves at a later date if the going gets too
tough.”  The implementability of ex post contracts should diminish such concerns because an ex
post contract can be viewed as a limited liability contract.  In this sense, as compared to an ex
ante contract, an ex post contract is more likely to be renegotiation-proof. 
Second, money and the LDC government’s negotiating power matter.  That is, the level
and pattern of equilibrium abatement is never first best because the budget and the ceiling
constraints bind at the optimum in both scenarios analyzed.  In other words, in the kind of
environment analyzed in this paper, the SNGA will never be able to design an IEA which
requires that pollution be abated at the first-best level.  Further, the attainment of the first-best
level of pollution abatement is closely linked to the SNGA's shadow value of funds and to the
shadow value of the ceiling constraints.  We have seen that as these shadow values approach
zero, the optimal contract can induce the firm to abate pollution at the first-best level in three of
the four states. 
Third, if given the option, the SNGA will, in general, prefer ex ante contracting to ex post
contracting.  Because ex ante contracting involves optimization with fewer constraints, the
SNGA's expected welfare with ex ante contracting is typically at least as high as his expected
welfare with ex post contracting.  However, in the context of LDCs, unless the SNGA can limit23
the ex post liability of the players, nations may well refuse to participate in ex ante contracting
schemes. 
The line of research pursued in this paper brings good news and bad news.  The good
news is that the SNGA can indeed circumvent the monitoring and enforcement problem
stemming from national sovereignty by designing collusion-proof ex post contracts.  The bad
news is that the SNGA cannot design ex post IEA’s in which first-best levels of pollution
abatement obtain. 
With talk of rising disparity between the South and the North and the increasingly
acrimonious nature of international discussions regarding the use of environmental resources, the
design question studied in this paper takes on particular significance.  This is in no small measure
due to the fact that the implementation of such agreements will do more to engender and maintain
international security than will most strategic or unilateral policy measures. 24
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21:459-66. ipi(xi Ti) i i{B[ ] Br} i i{ ˆ x j xi} {T3 g( ) T2 g( )} i i ˆ M j{G
j
r
i, i, , i, i 1,...,4
1{ B[ ]/ T1} 1 p1 ,
2{ B[ ]/ T2} 2 p2 , 3{ B[ ]/ T3} 3 p3 ,
4{ B[ ]/ T4} 4 p4 , 1B [ ]g (a1) p1 1 ,
2B [ ]g (a2) g (a2 ) p2 2 , { 3B [ ] }g (a3) p3 3 ,
4B [ ]g (a4) p4 4 .
i>0, i. 1 0 1 p1 ,
1 > 0 . 2 0 2 (p2 ) , 2 > 0 . B[ ]/ T3 ( 3 p3)/ 3 .
B[ ]/ T3 (0, ) , 3 > 0 . 4 0 4 p4 ,
4 > 0 .
i > 0 , i .
i 1 i 2, 3, 4 . 1 0 T1
1 > 0 . 1 > 0 .
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I shall check later to see that (A4) is satisfied. 
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Appendix
In this appendix, I provide the proofs of the two Theorems stated in the text of the paper.
Both proofs involve Kuhn-Tucker analysis. 
Proof of Theorem 1:  I  shall proceed by means of seven steps.  The Lagrangian is  
23
(a)
where   are the multipliers corresponding to (A1), (A2), (A3), and (A5),
respectively.  The first-order necessary conditions are:  (a1) 
(a2)   (a3)   (a4)
 (a5)   (a6)
 (a7)   and (a8)
 
Step 1:  The firm participation constraints bind at the optimum. 
Proof:  I have to show that    From (a1)   a contradiction.  Thus
  From (a2)   a contradiction. Thus,    From (a3) I get 
 Since   it follows that    From (a4)   a
contradiction.  Thus   
Step 2: The budget constraints bind at the optimum. 
Outline of Proof:  I have to show that    I shall demonstrate the validity of this claim
for   only.  The argument is similar for      implies that   can be lowered
without violating   This is a contradiction.  Thus,   i > 0 , i .
i 3 i 1, 2, 4 . 3 0 a3
3 > 0 . 3 > 0 .
0 T3 a3 3 > 0 .
> 0 .
Ti Tr g(ai) , i .
i > 0 , i .
a > ai , i .
0 < g (a1) (p1 1)/(p1 1) < 1 g (a ) a1 < a .
0 < g (a2) < (p2 2)/(p2 2) < 1 g (a ) a2 < a .
0 < g (a3) (p3 3)/(p3 3) < 1 g (a ) a3 < a . 0 < g (a4) (p4 4)/(p4 4) < 1 g (a ) a4 < a .
A1 g (a1) A3 g (a3) A4 g (a4) > A2 g (a2) ,
Ai (pi i)/(pi i) , i 1 ,..., 4 .
(p2 2)/(p2 2) g (a2) < 1 (pi i)/(pi i) g (ai) , i 1, 3, 4 .
i > 0 , i 2, 3, T2 g(a2) T3 g(a3) > T3 g(a3 ) .
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I will check later to see that (A4) and (B5) are satisfied. 
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Step 3:  The pollution reduction ceiling constraints bind at the optimum. 
Outline of Proof:  I have to show that    I shall demonstrate the validity of this claim
for   only.  The argument is similar for      implies that   can be raised
without violating   This is a contradiction. Thus,   
Step 4:  At the optimum, (A3) holds with equality. 
Proof:    implies that   can be lowered and   can be raised without violating 
This is a contradiction.  Thus,   
Step 5:  
Proof:  This follows from the fact that   
Step 6:  
Proof:  From (a1) and (a5) I get    From
(a2) and (a6) I get    From (a3) and (a7)
I get    Finally, from (a4)  and (a8) I get 
Step 7:    where
 
Proof:  From the proof to Step 6,
 
Finally, I shall check to see that (A4) is satisfied.  Since    I conclude that 
 This completes the proof of Theorem 1. 
Proof of Theorem 2:  I shall proceed by means of thirteen steps.  The Lagrangian is  
24ipi(xi ¯ Gi ¯ Ti) i i{B[ ] Br} i i{V( ) Vr} i i{ ˆ x
j xi} { ¯ T3 g( ) ¯ T2 g(
g( ) ¯ G2 ¯ T2 g( ) 2 ¯ G4 ¯ T4 g( ) ¯ G3





i, i i, , l, , i, i 1,2,3,4, l 1,2,
1V ( ¯ G1) p1 1 1, 2V ( ¯ G2) p2 1 2, 3V ( ¯ G3) p3 2 3,
4V ( ¯ G4) p4 2 4, 1{ B[ ]/ ¯ T1} p1 1 1, 2{ B[ ]/ ¯ T2} p2 1 2, 3{ B[ ]/ ¯ T3} p3 2 3,
4 B[ ]/ ¯ T4 p4 2 4 , { 1B [ ] 1}g (a1) p1 1,
{ 2B [ ] 1}g (a2) p2 2 { }g (a2 ), { 3B [ ] 2 }g (a3) p3 3, { 4B [ ] 2}g (a4) p4 4.
(p1 1 1)/ 1 V ( ¯ G1) > 0 1 > 0 .
1V ( ¯ G1) 1B [ ]. 1 0 1V ( ¯ G1) 0, 1 > 0 .
2 0 p2 ( 1 2), 2>0.
2V ( ¯ G2) 2B [ ]. 2 0 2V ( ¯ G2), 2 > 0 .
(p3 2 3)/ 3 B [ ]>0 3>0. 3 0 p3 2 3.
3 /B [ ], 3 > 0 .
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(b)
where   are the multipliers associated with (A1), (B1),
(A2), (A3), (B2), (B3), (B4), and (A5), respectively.  The first-order necessary conditions are (b1)
 (b2)   (b3)  (b4)
 (b5)   (b6)   (b7)  
(b8)   (b9)   (b10)
 (b11)   and (b12) 
Step 1:  The state 1 government and firm participation constraints bind at the optimum. 
Proof:  From (b1) I get    From (b1) and (b5) I get
  Now   a contradiction. Thus     
Step 2: The state 2 government and firm participation constraints bind at the optimum.
Proof:  From (b2)   which is impossible.  Thus,    From (b2) and (b6)
  Now   a contradiction.  Thus,   
Step 3:  The state 3 firm and government participation constraints bind at the optimum. 
Proof:  From (b7) I get    From (b3) 
Substituting this value of   in (b7) I get   a contradiction.  Thus,   
Step 4: The state 4 government and firm participation constraints bind at the optimum.(p4 2 4)/ 4 V ( ¯ G4) > 0 4 > 0 .
4V ( ¯ G4) 4B [ ]. 4 0 4V ( ¯ G4) 0, 4 > 0 .
¯ G1 ¯ G2 ¯ G3 ¯ G4.
i > 0 , i .
i 0, i i, i 1,...,4, ¯ Gi ¯ Ti
i>0, i>0 i. i > 0 , i .
i 0, i i, i 1,2,3,4, ai,
i>0 i. i > 0 , i .
a >ai, i.
0<g (a1) (p1 1)/(p1 1)<1 g (a ) a1<a .
0<g (a2)<(p2 2)/(p2 2)<1 a2<a .
0<g (a3) (p3 3)/(p3 3)<1 a3<a .
0 < g (a4) (p4 4)/(p4 4) < 1 a4 < a .
0 ¯ T3 g(a3)>¯ T2 g(a2 ), ¯ T3
3>0. >0.
0 ¯ G3> ¯ G2, >0. ¯ G3
3>0 3>0. >0.
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Proof:  From (b4) I get    From (b4) and (b8) I get
  Now   a contradiction. Thus,   
Step 5:    
Proof:  This follows from the fact that   
Step 6:  For every state, the budget constraint binds at the optimum. 
Proof:  Suppose not.  Then   and for any   the SNGA can lower   and  ,
without violating   and   for that same    This is a contradiction.  Thus,   
Step 7:  The pollution reduction ceiling constraints bind at the optimum. 
Proof:  Suppose not.  Then   and for any   the SNGA can raise   without
violating   for that same    This is a contradiction.  Thus   
Step 8: 
Proof:  (b5) and (b9) yield    From (b6) and (b10) I
get
  From (b7) and (b11) I get
  Finally, from (b8) and (b12) I get
 
Step 9:  Constraint (A3) binds at the optimum. 
Proof:    which tells us that   can be lowered without violating
  This is a contradiction. Thus,   
Step 10:  Constraint (B4) binds at the optimum. 
Proof:  Suppose not.  Then   and (B4) reduces to    This tells us that   can be
lowered without violating   and    This is a contradiction.  Thus,   ˜ A1g (a1) ˜ A3g (a3) ˜ A4g (a4)> ˜ A2g (a2), ˜ Ai (pi i)/(pi i), i 1,...4.
˜ A2g (a2) < 1 ˜ A1g (a1) ˜ A3g (a3) ˜ A4g (a4) .
¯ Ti Tr g(ai), i.
i > 0 , i .
¯ G2 ¯ G3.
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Step 11:    where   
Proof:  From the proof to Step 8, it follows that
 
Step 12:  
Proof:  This follows from the fact that   
Step 13:  Constraints (B2) and (B3) bind at the optimum. 
Proof:  This follows upon substitution of the results of Steps 5 and 12 into (B2) and (B3),
respectively. 
I now check to see that (A4) and (B5) are satisfied.  The fact that (A4) is satisfied can be
verified in a manner analogous to that employed in the proof of Theorem 1.  Having shown that
(A4) is satisfied, to verify that (B5) is satisfied, it suffices to note that from Step 5,    This
completes the proof of Theorem 4. 